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Abstract
Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing
contracts is often imperfect. We explore the implications of weak enforcement of con-
tractual commitments on the licensing conduct of firms and market performance. An
upstream firm develops a technology that it can license to downstream firms using a fixed
fee and a per-unit royalty. Strictly positive per-unit royalties maximize the licensor’s profit
if competition among licensees limits joint profits. Although imperfect contract enforce-
ment lowers the profits of the upstream firm, weak enforcement lowers prices, increases
downstream innovation, and in some circumstances can increase total economic welfare.
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1 Introduction
Licensing allows inventors and licensees to profit from the transfer of technology. Graham
et al. (2009) found that nine out of ten venture-backed biotechnology startups negotiated li-
censes to gain (at least in part) access to technology, information, or know-how. In 2004 the
top 20 pharmaceutical companies derived 19.5% of their sales of drugs from licensed prod-
ucts (Datamonitor, 2005). This paper focuses on markets in which licensing is desirable to
transfer technology but enforcement of licensing contracts is imperfect. An application is the
use of licenses to facilitate technology transfer to licensees that operate in jurisdictions with
weak enforcement of intellectual property rights. Studies have found that stronger intellectual
property rights encourage cross-border licensing (Smith, 2000) and increase technology transfer
within multinationals (Brandstetter, 2006). In a study of licensing by Japanese firms, Nagaoka
(2009) suggests that stronger intellectual property regimes encourage the substitution of patent
licensing for foreign direct investment.
Technology licensing contracts that require the licensee to pay the licensor a combination
of fixed and variable fees are common. According to the Association of University Technol-
ogy Managers, royalties that vary with licensee sales accounted for about three-quarters of the
revenues collected from licensing technologies developed by major universities, hospitals and
research organizations over the period 2009-2012 (AUTM Reports). These “running royalties”
allow the licensor and licensee to share the risk of uncertain demand for the licensed technology
(Bousquet et al. 1998), address managerial incentives (Saracho, 2002), and provide a means
for a cash-strapped licensee to finance the cost of the technology. Relative to using only fixed
or variable fees, a combination of fixed fees and fees that vary with sales allows a licensor to
extract more revenue from licensees that differ in their willingness to pay for the technology
(Schmalensee, 1981). Furthermore, fees that depend on sales allow a licensor to soften compe-
tition for products that employ the licensed technology, potentially increasing the total profits
available to the licensor and licensees and allowing greater total licensing revenues including
fixed fees (Kamien, 1992, Hernández-Murillo and Llobet, 2006). We focus on the use of variable
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fees to soften competition, although our analysis is applicable to other licensing arrangements
in which the use of variable fees increases joint profits.
A technology rights owner may be at risk from under-reporting of contractually required
payments by a licensee if the licensor cannot perfectly monitor and enforce the conduct of the
licensee. A report of audited licenses for intellectual property found that 89 percent of the
licensees under-reported their royalty obligations (Stewart and Byrd, 2014). Under-reporting
typically was not interpreted as cheating but rather was a consequence of differences in con-
tract interpretation. A recent example is a dispute between Microsoft and Samsung in which
Samsung maintained that its licensing agreement with Microsoft, which obligated Samsung to
pay royalties for each smartphone it sells, did not apply after Microsoft acquired Nokia’s hand-
set business (Waters, 2014). In other situations a licensor may conclude that a licensee has
abused a license by employing the licensed technology in unauthorized applications or locations.
Schuett (2012) considers the probabilistic enforcement of contract terms for patent licenses that
contain a field-of-use restriction. Under-reporting also can occur from disallowed deductions,
misuse of transfer prices, and failure to report sub-licenses. In our contracting model, licensees
have incentives to cheat on licensing terms, but royalties are chosen such that cheating does
not occur in equilibrium. That characterization is not inconsistent with the survey of licensees,
which attributes under-reporting primarily to differences in contract interpretation rather than
strategic failures to comply with agreed upon contract terms (i.e., cheating).
We address how the risk of under-reporting affects the design of licensing contracts, com-
petition, and incentives for investments to improve the licensed technology. Although the
form of the intellectual property right is not crucial for the analysis, we assume that it is a
patent, which gives its owner the exclusive right to make, use or sell the technology covered
by the patent unless the patentee chooses to share or transfer that right through a licensing
agreement. We also note that the implications of weak enforcement for the design of licensing
contracts are relevant to other vertical relationships, such as contracts between a franchisor
and a franchisee and contracts between a manufacturer and downstream distributors of the
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manufacturer’s products.1
When enforcement of licensing contracts is imperfect, royalties that depend on the conduct
of the licensee create incentives to cheat (or otherwise evade licensing terms) by under-reporting
royalty obligations. We explore the implications of weak enforcement for prices and incentives
for innovation. High per-unit royalties maximize joint profits when licensees supply products
that are close substitutes, but weak enforcement constrains the maximum royalty that the licen-
sor can charge without inducing licensees to cheat. Imperfect enforcement of licensing contracts
undermines the use of per-unit royalties to soften downstream competition and is more likely
to impose a constraint on royalties when downstream products are close substitutes. When the
cheating constraint is binding, a central conclusion is that weak enforcement increases incentives
for innovation for licensees and in some circumstances may increase total welfare. However,
if contract enforcement is very weak, the licensor may abandon the use of variable royalties
to regulate downstream competition and instead choose to license a technology exclusively or
vertically integrate with one or more potential licensees.
Several authors have focused on the economic consequences of potential infringement by
unauthorized technology users and addressed licensing as a means to deter infringement that
would occur without a license. Examples include Gallini (1984, 1992), Gallini and Winter
(1985), and Aoki and Hu (1999). In these papers the purpose of the license is to offer an
alternative to infringing conduct and licensing, when it occurs, is enforced perfectly.
We focus on compliance with licensing contracts and ignore the possibility that firms without
a license may infringe or invent around the licensed product. Situations commonly occur in
which a firm that is not a licensee cannot practically compete by imitating a supplier’s product.
The firm may require know-how, research tools or materials that are vital to make or sell a
commercial product or may not have the technological resources to invent around the licensed
product. In other settings, a franchisee or distributor may be unable to sell a product that
is a close substitute for the product supplied by a franchisor or a manufacturer, but may act
1Improved monitoring technologies allow more effective contract enforcement. Mortimer (2008) shows that
the contracts between a distributor and retail stores changed from only fixed fees to profit sharing (a form of
running royalties) when cheaper computer systems improved monitoring of retail sales.
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opportunistically in ways that contradict a contractual arrangement between the parties.
Imperfect enforcement of licensing contracts differs from imperfect enforcement of patents:
if a patent turns out to be invalid, other firms can use the technology for free. There is a public
good feature involved in challenging the validity of a patent (Farrell and Shapiro, 2008). Breach
of a licensing agreement is different in the sense that successful breach of the contract does not
make the technology freely available to others. A firm’s incentives to challenge a patent are
weakened by increased competition because the gains from litigating the patent are small. In
contrast, breach of a licensing contract lowers only the breaching licensee’s costs and increases
only that licensee’s profit.2
Our analysis is related to the literature on cumulative innovation (Scotchmer, 1991) in that
a focus is on innovation by technology users. Also related is research on market structure and
innovation by Spulber (2013), who concludes that strong intellectual property rights comple-
ment competition in creating incentives for innovation. However, we find that when licensing
contracts are enforced perfectly, an increase in competition can cause a rights owner to charge
higher royalties that vary with output, which leads to a reduction in investment by licensees to
improve the licensed products. In contrast, weak contract enforcement promotes innovation by
lowering the royalties that the rights owner can profitably sustain without inducing licensees
to cheat on their contracted payments. Thus, in our model, it is not strong patent rights,
but rather weak enforcement of patent rights that facilitates downstream competition and in-
vestment. Moreover, we find that perfect contract enforcement is never privately optimal if
monitoring is costly and, in some circumstances, weak contract enforcement can increase total
economic welfare.
2 Joint profit-maximizing outputs and investments
We are concerned with the enforcement of licensing contracts and how imperfect enforcement
affects contract design, competition, and innovation. There is a single upstream firm denoted by
2This distinction between challenging the validity of a patent and violating a licensing contract does not
arise if there is no competition in the market (i.e., the licensee is a monopolist).
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U and two downstream firms denoted by j = 1, 2. The upstream firm invests u > 0 to develop
a new technology that enables production at constant marginal cost cj. The upstream firm
does not produce final goods, but instead licenses the technology to the downstream firms. The
incremental cost of licensing is zero. The downstream firms choose prices and also may invest
to improve the quality of the product. The products of the downstream firms are differentiated,
which gives the upstream firm an incentive to license both downstream firms.
Let pj be the price set by downstream firm j with p = (p1, p2) and let ej be the investment
by downstream firm j with e = (e1, e2). Demand for firm j’s product is qj(p, e) for j = 1, 2.
We use the following notation. Define
ρj = cj + rj,
pij(p, ρj, e) = (pj − ρj) qj(p, e),
and
pij(pi, ρj, e) = max
pj
(pj − ρj) qj(pj, pi, e),
where pi is the price set by Firm i 6= j.
Production with the licensed technology repeats indefinitely under stationary conditions. If
Firm j accepts a license and reports royalty obligations truthfully, the firm earns
1
1− δpij(pi, ρj, e)− ej − Fj (1)
where δ ∈ [0, 1〉 is the per-period discount factor.
Assumption 1: Firm j’s profit without a license is zero.
Assumption 1 simplifies the analysis by making the reservation value of a downstream firm
equal to zero if the firm does not have a license, either because the firm has refused the offer
of a license or has a license revoked for cheating. Assumption 1 also implies that a firm cannot
profitably infringe the technology owned by the upstream firm by operating without a license.
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As discussed in the introduction, this situation can occur, for example, because the license
conveys know-how or materials that are essential for the firm to operate profitably.
We begin by establishing as a baseline for the analysis the outputs and investments that
maximize the joint profits of the licensor and her licensees. Joint profits are
ΠJ(p, c, e) =
1
1− δ [pi1(p, c1, e) + pi2(p, c2, e)]− e1 − e2, (2)
where c = (c1, c2). Conditional on investments (e1, e2), the joint-profit maximizing prices are
(pJ1 , p
J
2 ) = arg max
p1,p2
[pi1(p, c1, e) + pi2(p, c2, e)].
The joint-profit maximizing solution has qJj = qj(pJ , e) > 0 for j = 1, 2.
We add the usual assumptions to assure unique interior solutions for the profit-maximizing
prices and investments.
Assumption 2 (Uniqueness):
i) The profit functions satisfies3
∂2pii
∂p2i
+
∂2pii
∂pi∂pj
< 0 i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i
to ensure a unique equilibrium in the price setting game.
ii) To ensure that the optimal investments are positive and unique we assume that ∂ΠJ(p, c, e)/∂ej >
0 at ej = 0, limej→∞ΠJ(p, c, e)/∂ej < 0, and the Hessian matrix of ΠJ(p, c, e) is negative
semidefinite. We make similar assumptions for the individual profit functions.
The joint-profit-maximizing prices and investments satisfy for j = 1, 2:
dΠJ(p, c, e)
dpj
= 0,
3The condition for uniqueness is provided by Friedman (1977, p.71).
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dΠJ(p, c, e)
dej
= 0.
3 Licensing and enforcement
The upstream Firm U may offer licenses to downstream Firms 1 and 2 or choose to license a
single producing firm exclusively. We allow the contract to depend on whether both downstream
firms or only one firm licenses the new technology. A licensing contract describes the running
royalty paid per unit, rj, and a fixed fee paid up front, Fj. Let (r1, F1) and (r2, F2) describe
the offered fee structure to Firms 1 and 2 given that both firms accept the contract. Let
(rs1, F
s
1 ) and (rs2, F s2 ) represent the fee structure if only Firm 1 or Firm 2 accepts the licensing
contract. We assume that contracts are observable and the licensor can commit not to renege
on a contract with one party. This avoids the problems studied by Rey and Tirole (1986), Katz
(1991), O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and others in which a failure to commit to contracts with
downstream firms results in renegotiations that increase output. If the research firm licenses
only a single firm, it will charge only a fixed fee, rsj = 0 and F sj > 0 (O’Brien and Shaffer,
1992).
3.1 Contracting and timing
Suppose that Firm U has developed a new technology (invested u) and offers contracts to
downstream firms.4 The sequence of offers and actions are as follows:
1. Contracting:
(a) Upstream firm U offers licensing contracts (rj, Fj) to downstream Firm 1 and Firm 2.
(b) If only one downstream firm accepts, it is optimal to charge only a fixed fee, F sj > 0
2. Investment:
(a) Firms 1 and 2 choose investments e1 and e2 respectively.
4With perfect contract enforcement and firms that sell differentiated products, it is never optimal to license
either Firm 1 or Firm 2 exclusively.
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3. Competition (repeated):
(a) Firms choose prices p1 and p2 simultaneously.
(b) Firms report their sales volumes and pay per-unit royalties.
4. Enforcement (repeated):
(a) If Firm j under-reports contractual royalties, upstream firm U litigates the firm and
a court verifies cheating with probability ϕ.
(b) If under-reporting is not verified, the game continues without punishment.
If under-reporting is verified, the contract is enforced and the under-reporting li-
censee is penalized in the current period and/or in future periods.
With no uncertainty and perfect foresight the upstream firm can set a fixed fee that extracts
all of the downstream firms’ profits. Nonetheless, the downstream firms have incentives to invest
to maximize their profits conditional on the fees if they accept the offered contracts, as to do
otherwise would result in negative profits. We assume that if profits are identical for a range
of investments, the firm chooses the smallest investment.
Stage 3 (pricing and reporting decisions) and Stage 4 (enforcement) are repeated indefinitely
or until the patent expires. Section 3.3.1 discusses patent expiration while the other parts of
the paper assume that the technology is protected in ways that do not expire at a certain date
(e.g., the firm may possess complementary assets that are necessary to use the technology and
cannot be duplicated by others).
Let (p∗1, p∗2) denote the equilibrium downstream prices when both firms report their royalty
obligations truthfully. The downstream firms choose these prices simultaneously. If Firm
j under-reports contractual royalties, the firm will choose a profit-maximizing price pˆj that
depends on its expected costs, including penalties, and on the price chosen by its rival. We
assume that Firm i 6= j does not respond to pˆj by choosing a price different from p∗i if Firm
i reports truthfully. If firms could observe and respond to their rivals’ prices, this would add
a further disincentive for under-reporting royalties, as doing so would trigger a price response
similar to the responses familiar from the theory of repeated games.
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3.2 Perfect contract enforcement
The upstream firm chooses (rj, Fj) in order to maximze
ΠU =
∑
j=1,2
[
Fj +
1
1− δ rjq
∗
j
]
(3)
subject to the participation constraint of the licensees (recall ρj = cj + rj)
Fj ≤ 1
1− δpij (p, ρj, e)− ej, (4)
the licensees’ pricing choices
pj = arg maxpij (p, ρj, e) , (5)
and the licensees’ investment choices
ej = arg max
(
1
1− δpij (p, ρj, e)− ej
)
. (6)
Let Π(·) be discounted profits and pi(·) be per-period profits (excluding the cost of invest-
ments):
Π∗j(ρ, e) =
1
1− δpij(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, ρj, e)
and
q∗j (e) = qj(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, e),
where
p∗j = arg maxpij (pj, p
∗
i , ρj, e)
and the Nash equilibrium prices with perfect contract enforcement are (p∗1, p∗2). To simplify the
exposition we suppress the equilibrium prices (stage 3) when we examine optimal investments
and contracts (stages 1 and 2).
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Lemma 1. i) The sign of the effect of rj on Firm j’s investment is given by
sign
(
dej
drj
)
= sign
(
∂2pi∗j
∂ej∂rj
)
,
ii) the sign of the effect of rj on Firm i’s investment is given by
sign
(
dei
drj
)
= sign
(
∂2pi∗j
∂ej∂rj
∂2pi∗i
∂ej∂ei
)
,
iii) and sign
(
dej
drj
)
= sign
(
dei
drj
)
if investments are strategic complements, ∂
2pi∗i
∂ej∂ei
> 0.
The proof of this lemma and other results are in Appendix A. Intuitively, Firm j’s investment
is a non-increasing function of the firm’s per-unit royalty if an increase in the royalty lowers
Firm j’s marginal profit from investing The full information assumptions in the model imply
that the licensor’s profit is equivalent to
ΠU(ρ1, ρ2) =
∑
j=1,2
[(
1
1− δ
)(
pi∗j + rjq
∗
j
)− ej] .
Let (r∗1, r∗2) be the licensor’s optimal per-unit royalties with perfect contract enforcement and
let (e∗1, e∗2) be the corresponding profit-maximizing investments by the downstream licensees.
Furthermore, let (r¯1, r¯2) be the licensor’s optimal per-unit royalties if downstream investments
are held constant at (e∗1, e∗2).
Assumption 3: ΠU(ρ1, ρ2) is a concave function of (ρ1, ρ2).
Assumption 3 follows from Assumption 2 (the Hessian matrix of ΠJ(p, c, e) is negative
semidefinite) if the Nash equilibrium prices p∗j are not too convex functions of rj for j = 1, 2.
The following proposition describes sufficient conditions for which the licensor will lower the
per-unit royalty when royalties influence downstream investments.
Proposition 1. Suppose r¯j > 0 for j = 1, 2. Then r∗j < r¯j for j = 1, 2 if
(i) total royalties collecting from Firm j are a strictly increasing function of ej,
(ii) an increase in the royalty lowers Firm j’s marginal profit from investing, and
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(iii) investments are strategic complements.
Intuitively, the licensor will lower per-unit royalties relative to a situation in which down-
stream investments are fixed if lower per-unit royalties cause the firms to invest more and if
greater investment allows the licensor to collect a higher total royalty. From Lemma 1, a lower
per-unit royalty rj will induce both licensees to invest more if an increase in the royalty lowers
Firm j’s marginal profit from investing and if investments are strategic complements.
Proposition 1 follows because the upstream licensor cannot directly control the downstream
licensees’ investments. We will later see that imperfect enforcement may induce the licensor
to decrease per-unit royalties further and this may strengthen downstream firms’ investment
incentives.
Remark 1. Suppose
dpi∗6=k
dek
= 0. Then a sufficient condition for investment to lower optimal per-
unit royalties is that the weighted total output rjq∗j +riq∗i is an increasing function of investment
by either firm, dej
drj
< 0 for j = 1, 2, and downstream investments are strategic complements.
The result follows from the proof of Proposition 1. Given the envelope condition for invest-
ment by Firm j, on the margin downstream investment by Firm j affects only variable royalties
and not fixed fees if dpi
∗
i
dej
= 0 for i 6= j. Although the condition dpi
∗
6=k
dek
= 0 is strong, it is satisfied
for some demand functions and in particular for the log-linear demand example in Section 7.
3.3 Enforcement of licensing contracts
We now consider how the enforcement constraint affects the licensor’s optimal royalties. As
before, let (p∗1, p∗2) represent the Nash equilibrium prices conditional on investments (e1, e2)
when the firms face the per-unit royalties (r1, r2) and truthfully report their royalty obligations.
Enforcement adds the additional constraint that variable royalties must not be so large that
the licensee has incentives to under-report royalty obligations to the licensor’s maximization
problem with truthful reporting given by the objective function (3) and constraints (4), (6),
and (5).
Suppose a license calls for payment of a royalty rj for each unit of product made or sold
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by the licensee that employs the licensed technology. The licensee cheats if he fails to pay
a fraction s > 0 of the contractually specified royalties. The incentive to cheat depends on
the probability that cheating is detected and the resulting consequences. The U.S. Patent Act
provides that:5
Upon finding for the claimant [patent holder] the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with
interest and costs as fixed by the court.
Only the royalty is relevant to an inventor who cannot practice the technology described in the
patent.6
In other contexts, cheating can expose a licensee to different damage rules. A court may
treat the failure to pay specified royalties as a breach of contract, in which case contract law
would apply, and if the licensed intellectual property is protected by copyright, the copyright
owner may be entitled to the licensee’s “unjust enrichment”, the profits earned by the licensee
as a consequence of its infringing conduct (Ben-Shahar, 2011). We assume that a failure to
pay royalties exposes the licensee to liability to reimburse the licensor for the unpaid royalties
and possible restrictions on the future use of the patented technology. However, because the
consequences of a failure to pay required royalties may differ in other circumstances, we explore
the implications of alternative damage rules in Appendix B. There we show that none of our
qualitative results depend on the alternative rules, although they have different quantitative
implications for the ability to enforce particular royalty levels.
We assume that the licensor can costlessly detect an underpayment of royalties by a licensee,
but cannot recover damages without establishing underpayment in a legal proceeding. If the
licensor sues, the court or other administrative body imposes penalties for the underpayment
535 U.S.C. §284.
6Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001), Choi (2009), Henry and Turner (2010), and Aoki and Hu (1999)
consider the implications of alternative damages rules to compensate lost profits from infringement of intellectual
property rights. Issues related to damage rules studied in these papers do not arise if the technology owner does
not make or sell a product in competition with her licensees.
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with probability ϕ (the “enforcement probability”). We simplify by assuming ϕ is constant and
independent of the licensee.
If the suit results in a finding of liability, the licensee pays the licensor an amount propor-
tional to the unpaid royalties:
Dj(sj) = βsjrjqj(p, e)
where sj is the underpayment, qj is the licensee’s output conditional on the underpayment,
rj is the per-unit royalty, and β is a multiplier, which does not depend on the identity of the
licensee.7 We ignore litigation costs, which implies that the licensor has sufficient incentives to
litigate a licensee who cheats on the contract.
Conditional on a finding of liability, in addition to the penalty for unpaid royalties a licensee
may incur a reputation loss that affects its future stream of profits. We model this reputation
cost as equal to αpij(pi, ρj, e) in every future period with α ∈ [0, 1]. The reputation loss can
take different forms. The licensor can demand an injunction that prevents future use of the
intellectual property which, if granted, corresponds to α = 1. For example, in Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation v General Electric, the court awarded the patent owner a royalty
with interest after the defendant ceased to pay required royalties and issued an injunction
that prevented further use of the patent.8 If the licensor chooses (or is required by law) to
continue to deal with the licensee, the enforcement probability could increase if the licensee has
been found to have cheated in the past. We show below that this would allow the licensor to
charge a higher incentive compatible royalty r′ > r. In this case the licensee’s profit in each
period following a finding of liability would correspond to pij(pi, ρ′j, e) = (1− α)pij(pi, ρj, e) for
some α > 0, where ρ′j = c + r
′
j. In addition, the licensor may impose compliance costs on the
licensee or more restrictive license terms, for example by limiting the field of use of the licensed
technology. The harm to the licensee also could be realized in other licensing settings.9
7A court may impose damages up to three times (β = 3) the unpaid royalties in the event of willful infringe-
ment.
8U.S. District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin, 880 F. Supp. 1266; 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4188, March
29, 1995.
9The literature on tax evasion and commodity taxation generally assumes that it is costly to conceal true
sales from a taxing authority and discusses how these costs change optimal taxes (see e.g., Cremer and Gahvari,
13
If the licensee cheats, his expected profit in the cheating period is10
picj(sj, pi, ρj, e) = max
pj
{(pj − c− rj(1− sj))qj(pj, pi, e)− ϕDj(sj)}. (7)
Firm j’s best response with cheating is
pˆj = arg max{(pj − c− rj(1− sj))qj(pj, pi, e)− ϕDj(sj)}.
With damages equal to unpaid royalties,
picj(sj, pi, ρj, e) = pij(pi, ρj(sj), e),
where
ρj(sj) = c+ rj(1− sj(1− ϕβ)).
To simplify the notation we suppress prices and investments in what follows.
Let δ be the per-period discount factor. If the licensee cheats, his expected discounted
future profits are
Πcj = pi
c
j(sj, ρj) + ϕ
δ
1− δ (1− α)pij(ρj) + (1− ϕ)δΠ
c
j.
The first term is the profit from cheating in the period during which the cheating occurs. The
second term is the licensee’s future profit if the licensee is found liable for cheating weighted
by the probability of liability. This term includes the reputation effects from cheating (and is
zero if α = 1, corresponding to an injunction). The third term is the expected future profit if
1993). In our model the enforcement probability and threat of punishment (injunction and reputation loss)
influence the cost of concealing sales and the incentives for cheating.
10An implicit assumption is that cheating occurs in a single period. A straightforward extension would allow
for cheating to occur over multiple periods before detection.
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the licensee escapes a finding of liability. Re-arranging terms,
Πcj =
1
1− δ(1− ϕ)
[
picj(sj, ρj) +
δ
1− δϕ(1− α)pij(ρj)
]
.
Lemma 2. The licensee will not cheat if ϕβ ≥ 1 (i.e., will choose sj = 0). If ϕβ < 1, the
licensee will choose sj = 1 if he cheats.
The proof follows directly from the licensee’s profit, equation (7). If ϕβ ≥ 1, the licensee’s
profit is a maximum when sj = 0 and if ϕβ < 1, the licensee’s profit is a maximum when sj = 1.
We have assumed that the enforcement probability ϕ is constant. More generally, the
enforcement probability is determined by the legal system as well as the evidence of underpay-
ment. Suppose the enforcement probability depends on the amount of under-reporting, sj. A
sufficient condition for sj = 1 if the licensee cheats is
1− ϕ(sj)
ϕ′(sj)
> sj
for all sj. Note that s = 1 can be interpreted as cheating on all units in a market segment where
cheating is feasible (imperfect enforcement). There might be other markets where cheating is
infeasible.
We henceforth assume β = 1 (no enhanced damages).11 Given Lemma 2, the licensee’s total
expected present-value profit if he chooses to under-report royalties is
Πcj =
1
1− δ(1− ϕ)
[
picj(cj + ϕrj) +
δ
1− δϕ(1− α)pij(cj + rj)
]
. (8)
11From Lemma 2, a licensee will cheat if damages are no more than unpaid royalties. Courts award a multiple
of unpaid royalties only in exceptional cases, typically involving clear evidence that the infringement is willful.
We resolve this dilemma by pointing out that infringement, if enforced, burdens the infringing firm a loss of
future profits, in addition to any fixed costs (including the cost of litigation).
A second concern is that damages based on the royalties that a firm reasonably should have paid may
be circular if "reasonable" is determined by that royalties that courts typically award successful plaintiffs in
infringement actions. We avoid this indeterminacy because we envision a situation in which the plaintiff licensor
can establish her profit-maximizing royalty structure and can convince a court that she would have charged and
collected these royalties if the contract were enforced.
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If he chooses to report royalties truthfully his total expected present-value profit is
Π∗j =
1
1− δpij(cj + rj). (9)
The following proposition describes the conditions under which a per-unit royalty rj is
incentive compatible.
Proposition 2. Suppose the penalty for under-reporting royalties is
Dj(sj) = sjrjqj(p, e)
and is enforced with probability ϕ. If enforced, the licensee incurs a reputation loss equal to
a fraction α of the profit with truthful reporting. The licensee will not under-report for any
per-unit royalty rj if and only if 12,13
pij(p
∗
i , cj + rj) ≥ γpij(p∗i , cj + ϕrj), (10)
where
γ =
1
1 + αϕδ
1−δ
, (11)
δ is the discount factor and α ∈ (0, 1).
Firm j will not under-report royalties if Π∗j ≥ Πcj. Substituting equations (8) and (9), re-
arranging terms, and using equation (11) gives the result in inequality (10).
It is easier to sustain truthful reporting if γ is small. The parameter γ falls if the discount
rate (δ), the enforcement probability (ϕ), or the future loss from being held liable for under-
reporting (α) is increased. The licensee has an incentive to cheat for any rj > 0 if either α, δ,or
12We assume the licensee reports truthfully if he is indifferent to truthful reporting and under-reporting.
13The analysis is little changed if royalties are assessed on an ad valorem basis rather than per unit of the
licensed product. If the royalty is a percentage λ of Firm j’s revenues, the incentive compatibility constraint
becomes
pij(p
∗
i ,
c
1− λ, ej) ≥ γ
(
1− ϕλ
1− λ
)
pij(p
∗
i
c
1− ϕλ, ej).
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ϕ is zero.
Let rcj(γ) be the maximum per-unit royalty that satisfies the incentive compatibility con-
straint (10) for j = 1, 2 and define
rˆj(γ) = min(r
∗
j , r
c
j(γ)),
where r∗j is the optimal royalty with perfect contract enforcement. The incentive-compatibility
constraint is binding for Firm j if rˆj(γ) = rcj(γ). Otherwise, rˆj(γ) = r∗j .
Proposition 3. rˆj(γ) is weakly increasing in γ.
The proof follows from Assumption 3. The licensor’s profit is increasing in rj when rj < r∗j
for j = 1, 2. Furthermore, increasing γ allows the licensor to increase her profits by choosing a
larger value of rj without inducing cheating.
Corollary 1. Holding α and δ constant, rˆj is weakly increasing in ϕ. Holding ϕ constant, rˆj
is weakly increasing in α and δ.
Corollary 1 follows directly from Proposition 3 given the dependence of γ on α, δ, and ϕ.
Note that by constraining variable royalty payments to be less than a level that would induce
under-reporting by the licensee, the constraint also prevents the licensor from raising royalties
in a multi-period setting without commitment. In this respect imperfect contract enforcement
can be a safeguard against hold-up by the licensor when the licensee has to make irreversible
investments early on.
Suppose a new technology can obsolete the licensor’s technology. The discount rate δ can
represent a combination of a continuation probability θ and the discounting of future gains,
δ0 so that δ = θδ0. The continuation probability is the probability that the existing licensed
technology is not dominated by a novel and better technology in the next period.
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Corollary 2. Suppose that Industry A and Industry B have two symmetric licensees with the
same demand and costs, but the probability for introduction of a new and dominating technology
is higher in Industry A: θA > θB. Then
i) if the enforcement constraint is not binding, the running royalties are constant and equal
to the profit maximizing level, rˆk = r∗in both industries, k = A,B.
ii) if the enforcement constraint is binding, running royalties are lower in Industry A than
in Industry B, rˆA < rˆB.
The proof is immediate from Proposition 3 and the effect of θ on the discount factor and γ.
Running royalties depend on the likelihood of a new innovation only if the enforcement
constraint is binding, provided that alternative technologies have identical demands and costs.
Other analyses of licensing such as Gallini (1984, 1992), Gallini and Winter (1985), and Aoki
and Hu (1999) have focused on the incentives of downstream firms to innovate around the
existing technology to avoid licensing costs and showed how this will influence the royalty
structure. Our model suggests an alternative reason for lower royalties in innovative industries.
In what follows, unless stated otherwise we hold constant the future loss from being held
liable for under-reporting, α, and the discount rate, δ, and focus on the enforcement probability,
ϕ, replacing rcj(γ) with rcj(ϕ) and rˆj(γ) = min(rcj(γ), r∗j ) with rˆj(ϕ).
Corollary 3. Stronger enforcement (ϕ′ > ϕ) implies weakly lower downstream output.
Stronger enforcement has no effect if the enforcement constraint is not binding, correspond-
ing to rcj(ϕ) ≥ r∗j . If rcj(ϕ) < r∗j , each downstream firm’s output is a declining function of the
firm’s per-unit royalty, which is non-decreasing in ϕ.
In our licensing model, the licensor chooses per-unit royalties such that the licensee has no
incentive to cheat on the licensing contract. As noted in the Introduction, audits of licensing
contracts have found that under-reporting is common. However, under-reporting typically is
the result of differences in contract interpretation rather than failure to comply with agreed
upon contract terms. We could extend our model to allow for this type of under-reporting in
equilibrium by including a stochastic component that affects the value of the licensing contract
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and therefore the incentive to under-report royalties. This stochastic component can reflect
differences in the interpretation of the scope of the contract. Alternatively, we could assume
that there is uncertainty regarding the enforcement probability or the penalty. Yet another
approach is to allow for uncertain future profits, which can affect the incentive to under-report
royalties and sustain some under-reporting in equilibrium. We do not further develop these
extensions in this paper.
3.3.1 Licensing royalties and patent expiration
Suppose the licensed technology is protected by a patent that expires at date T. Following the
expiration of the patent, competition prevents the technology owner from charging a positive
per-unit royalty. The remaining patent term may affect the incentives for cheating on the
licensing contract and the licensor’s profit-maximizing royalties.
Proposition 4. Suppose licensees are symmetric with market demand and costs that are
constant over time. The patent on the licensed technology expires at date T.
i) If enforcement of licensing contracts is perfect, the optimal running royalty is the same
over the life of the patent.
ii) If the enforcement constraint is binding, the running royalty is weakly decreasing until
the patent expires, at which time the royalty is zero.
rˆt0 ≥ rˆt1 if t0 < t1 ≤ T
3.4 Competition and optimal royalties
How does downstream competition influence the enforcement constraint and thereby the max-
imum sustainable per-unit royalties? Products are more competitive if they are closer substi-
tutes. All else equal, the larger the cross-elasticity of demand, the greater the change in a firm’s
profit in response to a change in its price. Suppose demand for the two downstream products
is symmetric and the firms have equal marginal cost, c. Let ζ denote the degree of downstream
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competition as indexed by the cross-elasticity of demand.
In general, the cross-elasticity of demand and therefore the measure of downstream com-
petition depend on downstream prices. Let pˆj(ϕ) be Firm j’s profit-maximizing price if it
under-reports royalties. Furthermore, suppose ζA > ζB for all prices (p∗i , pˆj(ϕ)). This restriction
permits a characterization of the conditions under which an increase in downstream competition
affects the enforcement constraint.
Proposition 5. Assume that market A is more competitive than market B in the sense that
ζA > ζB for all prices (p∗i , pˆj(ϕ)). The maximum sustainable per-unit royalty is weakly lower for
market A than for market B if, for all ϕ ∈ 〈0, 1〉,
piAj (p
A∗
i , c+ ϕr)
piAj (p
A∗
i , c+ r)
>
piBj (p
B∗
i , c+ ϕr)
piBj (p
B∗
i , c+ r)
, (12)
where pk∗i is Firm i’s equilibrium price with truthful reporting for k = A,B.
The proof follows directly from the incentive compatibility constraint (10).
Proposition 5 offers a way to test whether a more competitive market has a lower sustainable
royalty. One might expect that in a more competitive downstream market the percentage
increase in per-period profit from under-reporting is larger than in a less competive market.
However, this is not generally correct. The result depends on the measure of competition and is
different for alternative specifications of demand. Consider the Hotelling and log-linear demand
specifications. In the Hotelling model of spatial competition with uniform demand on a unit
line,
qj =
pi − pj + t
2t
,
where t is the marginal disutility of distance from either supplier. The cross-elasticity of demand
is
ζ =
pj
pj − pi + t .
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At prices p∗i and pˆj,the cross-elasticity of demand is14
ζ =
c+ t+ 1
2
r(1 + ϕ)
t− 1
2
r(1− ϕ) .
This is decreasing in t. It is easily verified that condition (12) is satisfied for Hotelling demand
with the degree of competition indexed by the cross-elasticity of demand, which in turn depends
on t.
Next consider log-linear demand with constant own and cross-price elasticities,
qj = Ap
−η
j p
ζ
i .
The incentive compatibility condition is independent of ζ for log-linear demand. An increase
in the cross-elasticity of demand changes the licensee’s profit proportionally with and without
under-reporting and hence the ratios in inequality (12) are independent of the degree of compe-
tition. A more competitive downstream market does not satisfy inequality (12) if downstream
demand is log-linear.
In markets for which an increase in competition satifies the ratio condition (12), the licensor
must reduce the per-unit royalty in order to prevent under-reporting in equilibrium. This is
exactly the opposite of the prediction from common models with perfect contract enforcement
for which it is profit-maximizing to increase per-unit royalties to soften competition in more
competitive markets.
3.5 Investment with imperfect contract enforcement
The preceding results allow us to characterize the effects of imperfect contract enforcement
on investment. To simplify the notation, suppress the dependence of rcj on the enforcement
probability, ϕ. Weak contract enforcement changes investment incentives only to the extent
that lower per-unit royalties change the marginal effects of investments on downstream profits.
14Recall that pˆj is the best response given that Firm j is under-reporting while Firm i chooses p∗i and reports
truthfully. In the Hotellling model, p∗i = t+ c+ r and pˆj = t+ c+
1
2r(1 + ϕ).
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Proposition 6.
(i) If rˆj(ϕ) = rcj(ϕ) < r∗j for j = 1, 2, an increase in the strength of contract enforcement
ϕ weakly decreases Firm j’s investment if and only if ∂2pi∗j (ρ, e)/∂ej∂rj ≤ 0.
(ii) If rˆj(ϕ) = r∗j for j = 1, 2 , an increase in ϕ has no effect on downstream investment.
Conversely, weaker contract enforcement (weakly) lowers the per-unit royalties, which (weakly)
increases licensees’ outputs, profits, and investments when ∂2pi∗j (ρ, e)/∂ej∂rj ≤ 0 and the con-
straint is binding. Note that the familiar condition ∂pi∗j/∂rj = −q∗j does not generally hold in
this model. The reason is that the licensor’s choice of rj in the first stage affects the rival’s down-
stream investment and its equilibrium price, which have first-order effects on Firm j’s profit.
Absent these effects, weaker contract enforcement weakly increases downstream investments if
and only if ∂q∗j/∂ej ≥ 0.
Innovation can occur at any level in the value chain that supplies a product to a customer.
Spulber (2013) explores a model in which upstream inventors compete to license their inventions
to a downstream industry. As in our model, inventors offer fixed and per-unit royalties to
maximize their profits. He finds that greater downstream competition – as measured by the
number of downstream firms or the elasticity of substitution – increases incentives for upstream
invention. Our focus is on downstream innovation to improve upon a licensed technology. In our
model it does not generally follow that an increase in competition – as measured by the degree
of downstream substitution – promotes downstream innovation. An increase in downstream
competition can lead the licensor to charge higher per-unit royalties when licensing contracts can
be enforced perfectly. Higher royalties lower downstream profits and lead to less investment
to improve the products. We explore this result further in Section 7 below for a particular
functional form for downstream demand.
With perfect contract enforcement, whether competition reinforces incentives for innova-
tion depends on whether the activity occurs upstream by the developers of a new technology
or downstream by the firms that implement the new technology. Competition increases incen-
tives for upstream invention but may reduce incentives for downstream innovation. Factors
that limit the ability to appropriate the value of an invention or innovation such as weak con-
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tract enforcement have different implications for investment incentives and competitive effects.
Weak appropriability in our model corresponds to weak enforcement of licensing contracts,
which leads to relatively lower per-unit royalties and greater investment by licensees when
∂2pi∗j (ρ, e)/∂ej∂rj ≤ 0. The effects are particularly significant when downstream competition
would otherwise lead the licensor to choose high per-unit royalties to soften downstream com-
petition if contracts could be enforced perfectly.15
Our model is not inconsistent with the conclusions in Spulber (2013) if the focus is on
invention by the upstream licensor. Weak contract enforcement can force the upstream licensor
to choose a low per-unit royalty, which lowers her profits. The reduction in profit can be a
disincentive for the licensor to invest to create the technology in the first place or to improve
her invention to make it more useful for licensees.
For example, suppose downstream firms are symmetric and demand for the technology
depends on investment in upstream innovation, u. Holding downstream investment constant,
the upstream firm invests to maximize
Π(ρ, u)− u
where ρ = c+ r and r is the per-unit royalty charged to both symmetric downstream licensees.
With perfect contract enforcement, the upstream firm charges a per-unit royalty r∗ and invests
u∗ = arg max(Π(ρ∗, u) − u). A reduction in the per-unit royalty resulting from weak contract
enforcement causes the upstream firm to invest less if
du
dr
= −
∂2Π(ρ,u)
∂u∂r
∂2Π(ρ,u)
∂u2
> 0,
or if ∂
2Π(ρ,u)
∂u∂r
> 0. This condition is satisfied, for example, if demand is log-linear: qj = A(u)p−ηj p
ζ
i
with A′(u) > 0, ζ > 0, and η > ζ + 1.
15See also Vives (2008). Relatedly, López and Vives (2014) explore the relationship between competition
and cost-reducing R&D investment when firms have limited ability to appropriate the benefits from their
investments.
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Recall that ϕc is the smallest value of ϕ for which rc(ϕ) ≥ r∗. Although weak enforcement
can lower welfare by lowering the upstream firm’s profit and incentive to invent, a marginal
reduction in the enforcement strength ϕ increases total economic welfare.
Proposition 7. Suppose downstream firms are symmetric and demand for the technology
depends on investment in upstream and downstream innovation. Suppose further that rc(ϕ) is
strictly increasing in ϕ and downstream profit is strictly decreasing in ϕ in the neighborhood of
ϕc. Then there exists a δ > 0 for which total economic welfare is higher when ϕ = ϕc − δ than
when ϕ ≥ ϕc.
By definition, dΠ
U (ρ∗,u∗)
dr
= 0 when the per-unit royalty r = r∗. A small reduction in ϕ to ϕc−δ
results in a small reduction in r below r∗. This small reduction in the per-unit royalty has no
first-order effect on the licensor’s profit and therefore no adverse first-order effect on upstream
investment, u. However, the reduction in r has a first-order effect on lower downstream prices.
Thus the net effect of a small reduction in ϕ below ϕc is an increase in investment and economic
welfare.16
We have assumed throughout that the enforcement probability is exogenous. With this
assumption Proposition 7 implies that under some conditions weaker enforcement can increase
total welfare, but it does not increase the profits of the licensor (and licensee profits are zero with
profit-maximzing fixed fees). If the enforcement probability depends on efforts by the licensor,
it is possible that the licensor as well as consumers may benefit from weaker enforcement.
Suppose we ignore upstream investment but make the enforcement probability an endogenous
decision by the licensor that is observed by the licensees. The technology owner can increase
ϕ by exerting more effort to detect cheating. Let k(ϕ) be the cost of this effort, with k(0) = 0,
k′(ϕ) > 0, and k′′(ϕ) > 0. Allowing for asymmetric licensees, the licensor chooses ϕ to maximize
Π(ρ1(ϕ), ρ2(ϕ))− k(ϕ)
16This result is similar in some respects to Ayres and Klemperer (1999). Takeyama (1994) finds that copying
can increase the profits of a licensor when the licensed product benefits from positive network externalities.
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where ρk(ϕ) = ck + rk(ϕ) for k = 1, 2. Without loss of generality, suppose ϕc1 ≤ ϕc2.
Proposition 8. Given the above assumptions, if dΠ(ρ1(ϕ),ρ2(ϕ))
dϕ
< dk(ϕ)
dϕ
at ϕ = ϕc2, then the
technology owner maximizes profit by choosing an enforcement level ϕ∗ < ϕc2 and royalties
rˆ1(ϕ
∗) ≤ r∗1 and rˆ2(ϕ∗) < r∗2.
The proof follows immediately from the slopes of the profit and enforcement cost functions.
Under these assumptions, the technology owner chooses an enforcement level that is too weak
to sustain the optimal royalties with perfect contract enforcement for both licensees, although
the level may be sufficient to charge the royalty corresponding to perfect enforcement for one
of the licensees. By choosing a slightly an enforcement level slightly lower than the level that
would allow r∗j for both licensees, the licensor saves more in enforcement cost than she sacrifices
in profits.
Figure 1 illustrates this tradeoff for an example with symmetric licensees and log-linear de-
mand. In this example the licensor can choose the unconstrained royalty if the enforcement level
exceeds about 0.62. However, given the effort required to monitor contracts at this intensity,
the licensor optimally chooses a weaker enforcement level of about 0.50 and a correspondingly
lower per-unit royalty. Although the licensor’s profit excluding monitoring costs is lower at
the weaker enforcement level, consumers benefit from lower prices and downstream firms have
greater incentive to invest to improve their products.
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Figure 1: Licensor profit and cost of enforcement
This result complements the literature on digital rights management (DRM). If enforcement
is costly to the licensor, both the licensor and society can prefer weaker protection from misuse
of licensed intellectual property even if perfect protection is feasible. Both the technology
rights owner and economic welfare can benefit from imperfection contract enforcement when
enforcement is costly.
Although we share a central conclusion with the DRM literature that there is a trade-off
between the benefits of protection provided by DRM technologies and the costs of these tech-
nologies, the mechanism differs from what others have examined. For example, Scotchmer and
Park (2006) show that, by lowering the prices of the protected products, increased competi-
tion makes it less attractive for users to defeat DRM protections and correspondingly lowers
incentives for rights holders to invest in these DRM technologies. We show that increased
competition increases profit-maximizing per-unit royalties with perfect contract enforcement
and therefore makes it more difficult for rights holders to sustain these desired royalties when
contract enforcement is imperfect. As a result, if greater enforcement is increasingly costly,
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all else equal, rights holders will choose (weakly) less perfect enforcement (corresponding to
weaker DRM) when downstream markets are more competitive.
4 Incentives for exclusive licensing
The upstream firm may choose to deal exclusively with one licensee. In a sample of 1612
licensing deals over the period 1990-93, 37% granted exclusive rights to the licensee either
worldwide or in a geographic region (Anand and Khanna, 2000). The Association of University
Technology Managers reported that 41% of technology licenses in its 2007 survey were exclusive
(AUTM, 2007). Exclusivity entails an efficiency loss when potential licensees sell differentiated
products, but it has advantages such as committing the licensor to make the licensee the residual
claimant for investment in the licensed technology. Of particular relevance to the focus of this
paper, exclusive licensing avoids the cost of cheating when contract enforcement is imperfect
because the optimal per-unit royalty is zero with a single licensee. With an exclusive license,
the downstream firm pays only a fixed fee for the technology.17
Proposition 9. Suppose: (i) it is profit-maximizing to license both firms when contract en-
forcement is perfect; (ii) r∗j > 0 for j = 1, 2; and (iii) for some firm k, the firm’s monopoly
profit with a zero royalty exceeds the total profit earned by both licensees with a zero royalty.
Then there exists an enforcement level ϕˆ for which it is optimal for the licensor to license Firm
k exclusively if ϕ < ϕˆ.
Exclusive licensing solves the licensor’s enforcement problem by replacing the per-unit roy-
alty with a simple fixed fee. In addition, exclusive licensing can benefit the licensor by promoting
downstream investment. Suppose the two potential licensees are symmetric and sell products
that are partial substitutes. There are two reasons why investments can make exclusive licens-
ing more attractive for the licensor. First, because the downstream firms are substitutes, the
profit and output of an exclusive licensee are likely to be greater than the profit and output
17Of course the licensor could have reasons other than softening competition to have non-zero running royalties
for an exclusive licensee (e.g., risk-sharing).
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of any single non-exclusive licensee. If the return to investment increases with demand, each
non-exclusive licensee will invest less than the exclusive licensee. If downstream investments
are not too complementary, this increases the incentive for exclusive licensing.18 Second, the
exclusive licensee has a marginal cost c, while each non-exclusive licensee has a marginal cost
c+ r. If r > 0, the greater marginal cost of non-exclusive licensees further reduces output and
incentives for investment.
5 The choice of innovation projects
Investment decisions involve the types of technologies that firms may pursue as well as how
much to invest in each technology. In this section we explore the implications of weak contract
enforcement for technology choice by both the licensor and her licensees. We simplify by
assuming the licensees are symmetric. First we consider technology choice by the licensor.
5.1 Technology choice by the licensor
Suppose the licensor can choose technologies from a set I = {σ1, ..., σN} and it is cost-efficient
to develop only one of the possible technologies, which the licensor offers to both licensees. We
assume all technologies when employed provide the downstream firms with symmetric demand
and constant and equal marginal production costs. With perfect contract enforcement and with
no risk of infringement by unlicensed firms, the licensor would choose to license the technology
that maximizes the joint profit of the licensor and licensees. For a given technology, m, the
licensor’s profit is
ΠU(ρ∗m, σm) = 2 max
ej
[
1
1− δ (pij(ρ
∗
m, e, σm) + r
∗
mqj(ρ
∗
m, e, σm))− ej],
where ρ∗m = (c + r∗m, c + r∗m) and r∗m is the licensor’s optimal per-unit royalty with perfect
contract enforcement for technology σm.
18Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) provide an example with investments that lower production costs in which
downstream investments are not complementary.
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Let the subscript p denote the technology that maximizes the licensor’s expected profit with
perfectly enforced contracts. The licensor’s profit-maximizing technology may differ from σp
if contract enforcement is imperfect. Let rˆp be the profit-maximizing per-unit royalty with
imperfect contract enforcement for technology σp and rˆk the profit-maximizing per-unit royalty
with imperfect contract enforcement for technology σk. Furthermore, let ρˆk = c + rˆk and
ρˆp = c+ rˆp. The licensor will choose σk if
ΠU(ρˆk, σk) > Π
U(ρˆp, σp).
For example, the licensor may choose a project that enables greater product differentiation
by the licensed firms, allowing rˆk to be closer to the unconstrained profit-maximizing level, r∗k.
Given Assumption 3, ΠU(ρ, σk) is weakly increasing in r for r < r∗k. Therefore, with imperfect
enforcement, the licensor’s expected profit from σk can exceed her expected profit from σp even
though project σp would be more profitable if contract enforcement were perfect.
5.2 Technology choice by licensees
Suppose the licensees can choose between investing in Project A and Project B, both of which
employ the licensed technology. Project A maximizes joint profits under perfect enforcement.
Under imperfect enforcement a licensee can deviate by not paying running royalties and by
choosing an alternative innovation project, Project B. For comparison assume that the enforce-
ment probability is the same for both technologies and cheating incurs the same reputation
costs. The opportunity to deviate in two ways makes the no-cheating constraint more demand-
ing to satisfy,
piA(cA + r) ≥ γmax {piA(cA + ϕr), piB(cB + ϕr)} . (13)
If piB(cB+ϕr) > piA(cA+ϕr), then the royalty r must be lower than in the case where innovation
Project B is not available.
Weak enforcement has two detrimental effects for the licensor. Weak enforcement reduces
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r as before. In addition, weak enforcement induces the downstream firm to choose a project
that does not maximize the licensor’s profit. Consequently, the licensor may have incentives to
choose licensees who are unable to do Project B, which would allow the licensor to charge a
higher running royalty. This can be optimal for the licensor even if the technology-constrained
licensee has a slightly higher production cost than another licensee that can invest in either
project.
These choices illustrate a tension between technology choice by the licensor and the licensee
with contrasting implications for strong and weak contract enforcement. With perfect contract
enforcement, the licensor will choose the technology that maximizes joint profits, regardless
of its implications for downstream differentiation. Licensees will favor technologies that imply
greater downstream product differentiation, as the corresponding lower per-unit royalty allows
them to earn more and increases the return from investment holding fixed fees constant.19
With imperfect contract enforcement, the licensor will favor technologies that imply greater
downstream product differentiation, because such technologies make it easier to support optimal
per-unit royalties when contract enforcement is weak. However, all else equal, licensees may
favor technologies that lower downstream product differentiation, notwithstanding the fact
that such technologies imply greater downstream competition, if low differentiation forces the
licensor to charge a low per-unit royalty when contract enforcement is weak. Conditional on
the fixed fees, the low per-unit royalty increases incentives for investment by the licensees and
may allow greater downstream profit.
6 Incentives for vertical integration
We have assumed that the upstream firm acts only as a licensor, licensing the technology
to downstream firms producing heterogenous but competing final goods. Alternatively, the
licensor may sell final goods, which it can do by integrating with one or more downstream firms.
With perfect contract enforcement the technology owner would not integrate with a potential
19Layne-Farrar and Llobet (2014) show that licensees’ competitive circumstances may affect the values they
can obtain with different technologies and influence technology choice.
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licensee if the result is a loss of productive efficiency. However, if contract enforcement is
imperfect, vertical integration may allow the technology owner to choose prices that are closer
to the prices that maximize joint profits, which can counteract a loss of productive efficiency.
6.1 Full vertical integration
Suppose that the upstream technology owner enters into the final goods market and produces
both products on its own. If there is no loss of efficiency from vertical integration, the resulting
prices maximize joint profits. This is no better than what the unintegrated technology owner
can accomplish through licensing if contract enforcement is perfect and there is no downstream
investment. If there is investment, vertical integration is weakly superior to licensing even if
contract enforcement is perfect.
The vertically integrated firm earns
ΠV (e) =
∑
j=1,2
1
1− δ
(
max
pj
(pj − cj) qj(pj, pi, e)
)
− ej
with i 6= j. Let pˆj be the vertically integrated firm’s optimal prices. The integrated firm’s
investments satisfy
eˆj = arg max
ej
[
1
1− δ (pˆj − cj) qj(pˆj, pˆi, e)− ej].
With perfect contract enforcement, the unintegrated licensor can choose per-unit royalties
r∗j such that p∗j = pˆj. However, investments satisfy
e∗j = arg max
ej
[
1
1− δ
(
(p∗j − cj − r∗j ) qj(p∗j , p∗i , e)
)− ej] .
Even if the unintegrated licensor can maximize joint profits without investments, the double-
marginalization from positive per-unit royalties implies that she cannot generally maximize
joint profits with investments. Therefore, if downstream firms can invest to improve their
products, vertical integration is superior to licensing if there is no loss of productive efficiency,
even if contract enforcement is perfect.
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Imperfect contract enforcement strengthens the case for vertical integration. The fully inte-
grated firm can maximize joint profits, with or without investment. Weak contract enforcement
lowers the licensor’s joint profit and therefore makes vertical integration more attractive relative
to licensing with perfect contract enforcement.20
6.2 Partial vertical integration
Suppose the licensor can merge with one, and only one, of the downstream producing firms.
There are two symmetric downstream firms and the licensor merges with downstream Firm
i. The joint-profit-maximizing prices and investments are unchanged. We explore how this
partial vertical integration affects prices and investments with and without enforceable licensing
contracts. Having already noted that vertical integration affects incentives for investment even
if contract enforcement is perfect, we ignore investment in this analysis.
If the upstream firm acquires one of the downstream firms, it acts to maximize the sum
of its downstream profit and its license revenue collected from the unintegrated firm.21 The
vertically integrated firm’s profit is
ΠVi = max
rj ,Fj ,pi
[
1
1− δ ((pi − c)qi(pi, pj) + rjqj(pi, pj)) + Fj
]
where Fj is the fixed licensing fee charged to downstream Firm j and rj is the per-unit royalty.
The non-integrated downstream firm chooses
p∗j = arg max(pj − c− rj)qj(pi, pj).
20Ignoring investment effects, Chen (2013) and others have questioned why a firm that controls an input may
refuse to sell the input to firms that are rivals in downstream markets. We show that weak contract enforcement
is an explanation for refusals to deal.
21Alternatively, the upstream technology owner could sell the technology to one of the downstream firms.
The acquiring firm then becomes both a producer in the downstream market and collects licensing revenue from
the unintegrated firm.
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Assuming the fixed fee extracts all of the non-integrated firm’s surplus,
ΠVi = max
rj ,pi
[
(pi − c)qi(pi, p∗j) + (p∗j − c)qj(p∗j , pi)
]
.
There is nothing to be gained from partial vertical integration if contracts can be enforced
perfectly, there are no investments, and no efficiency benefits from integration. The partially
integrated firm maximizes profit by charging pV Ii = pJi for its downstream product and offering
a contract (Fj, rj) to the unintegrated firm with rj = r∗j and F ∗j = pij(c + r∗j ). In particular,
there is no incentive for the integrated producer to act strategically by charging a royalty that
raises its rival’s cost. The integrated firm should charge a downstream price and royalty to
maximize the joint profit of the integrated firm and its licensee.
However, partial integration introduces an additional strategic concern. We have assumed
throughout that the licensor commits to its royalty terms. That is not a sufficient commitment
condition for profit-maximization by a partially integrated firm. Suppose the non-integrated
firm accepts the contract (F ∗j , r∗j ). The integrated firm would then choose its downstream price
to maximize
(pi − c)qi(pi, p∗j) + r∗j qj(pi, p∗j).
Suppose the integrated firm promised, but did not commit, to a price pJi when it offered the
licensing contract (F ∗j , r∗j ) to the unintegrated firm. After the licensee accepts the contract, the
integrated firm would choose a profit-maximizing price below pJi if the downstream products
are substitutes. This follows because r∗j < pJi − c. By lowering its price, the integrated firm
captures more demand, which earns the firm a higher margin (pi − c) than it earns on its
licensing revenues (r∗j ). If the licensee anticipates this lower price, the licensee would not
accept the offered contract without a reduction in the fixed fee. The inability of the integrated
firm to commit to its downstream price thus can be a deterrent to partial vertical integration,
even if the licensing contract can be enforced perfectly.
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6.3 Partial vertical integration with imperfect contract enforcement
A key question is whether partial vertical integration allows the technology owner to charge a
higher royalty when contract enforcement is imperfect without inducing one or more licensees
to cheat. If that is the case, partial vertical integration may allow the technology owner to
obtain a larger total profit than she could earn as an unintegrated licensor.
Let pˆi be the vertically integrated firm’s profit-maximizing downstream price and rj the
per-unit royalty charged to the unintegrated licensee. Suppose that the integrated firm can
commit to pˆi as well as to the offered contract terms. The licensee will not cheat if
pij(cj + rj, pˆi) ≥ γpij(cj + ϕrj, pˆi).
Holding pi constant, weak enforcement lowers the integrated firm’s maximum royalty, rcj ,
and this is a binding constraint if rcj < r∗j . Whether partial vertical integration allows the
integrated firm to charge a higher royalty than an unintegrated licensor with imperfect contract
enforcement depends on the interaction, if any, between rcj and the integrated firm’s downstream
price, pˆi. Therefore, it is not possible to make a general statement about the effect of partial
vertical integration on rcj , the maximum per-unit royalty that the licensor can charge without
inducing cheating.
To obtain additional results, we consider an example that imposes a particular structure of
demand and explore the implications for licensing terms offered by an unintegrated technology
owner, incentives for exclusive licensing, vertical integration, and competition and investment.
7 Log-Linear Demand
Suppose demand is log-linear and symmetric. Potential licensees face constant own and cross-
price elasticities and downsteam investment affects the magnitude of demand
qj(pj, pi, ej) = A(ej)p
−η
j p
ζ
i .
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The demand parameter A(ej) depends on investment by the licensee:
A(ej) = A0(ej)
σ, (14)
with 0 < σ < 1.
Downstream production has a constant marginal cost, c1 = c2 = c, in addition to any
per-unit royalty. To assure solutions, we impose the condition:
Assumption 4: η > ζ + 1.
7.1 Joint-profit maximizing outputs and investments
Joint profits are
ΠU = max
pj ,ej
[∑
j=1,2
1
1− δ (pj − c)qj(p1, p2, ej)− ej
]
.
Given the assumed symmetry, the prices that maximize joint profits are equal and given by
pJ1 = p
J
2 = p
J =
cη(1−D)
η(1−D)− 1 ,
where D is the diversion ratio:
D = −dq2/dp1
dq1/dp1
=
qi
qj
ζ
η
.
The diversion ratio is the fraction of sales lost by firm j in response to a price increase that is
gained by its rival and is a measure of the strength of downstream competition. With symmetric
demand,
D = ζ/η < 1.
The larger the diversion ratio, the greater the extent to which the licensees’ products are
substitutes for each other. Note that the joint-profit-maximizing prices are increasing in the
diversion ratio.
Given pJj , conditional on the diversion ratio each firm’s per-period downstream profit ex-
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cluding investment cost is
piJ(c, e) =
A0
η(1−D)(e)
σ
[(
η(1−D)
η(1−D)− 1
)
c
]−η(1−D)+1
.
Investments solve
1
1− δ
dpiJ(c, e)
de
= 1,
which implies
eJ =
σ
1− δpi
J(c, eJ)
and
ΠU =
2(1− σ)
1− δ pi
J(c, eJ).
7.2 Licensing with perfect contract enforcement
As before, let q∗j and pi∗j denote the Nash equilibrium outputs and profits with truthful reporting.
With perfect contract enforcement the licensor will choose r∗1 = r∗2 = r∗ to maximize joint profits
ΠU =
∑
j=1,2
1
1− δ
(
pi∗j + rjq
∗
j
)− ej. (15)
First consider the case with fixed investment. Each firm’s Nash equilibrium price is
p∗j =
(
η
η − 1
)
(c+ rj). (16)
Given the assumed symmetry, at an interior solution the licensor’s optimal royalty satisfies
r∗ =
cD
η(1−D)− 1 , (17)
which supports the joint-profit maximizing prices pJj . The per-unit royalty is increasing in the
diversion ratio with perfect contract enforcement.
Next suppose that the downstream firms invest to improve their products and maximize
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their profits. Each downstream firm invests so that
1
1− δ
dpi∗j (ρj, ej)
dej
= 1,
which implies
e∗j =
σ
1− δpi
∗
j (ρj, e
∗
j).
After solving for e∗j and substituting the result in equation (15), the licensor’s optimal
royalty is
r∗(σ) =
η(1− σ)
η − σ r
∗. (18)
This is strictly less than the optimal royalty with no investment when σ > 0. The licensor
lowers the per-unit royalty to encourage investment by downstream firms.
Remark 2. Relative to the joint-profit maximizing investment, there is under-investment when
contracts are enforced perfectly: e∗j < eJj .
This follows because r∗(σ) > 0 and pi∗j (c + r, e) < piJ(c, e). Double-marginalization lowers
downstream profits, which lowers incentives to invest.
7.3 Imperfect contract enforcement
Assume that it is optimal for the upstream firm to offer licenses to both firms even if contract
enforcement is imperfect. The licensor’s optimal per-unit royalty is
rˆ = min(r∗(σ), rc),
where r∗(σ) is the licensor’s optimal per-unit royalty with perfect contract enforcement and
rc is the maximum per-unit royalty for which the licensee will report his royalty obligations
truthfully when contract enforcement is imperfect.
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From the incentive compatibility condition (10),
rc(ϕ) = c
[
1− γ 1η−1
γ
1
η−1 − ϕ
]
(19)
provided that ϕ < γ
1
η−1 . If ϕ ≥ γ 1η−1 , then any royalty satisfies the incentive compatibility
condition.
Note that an increase in the enforcement probability ϕ increases the critical royalty rc
provided that ϕ < γ
1
η−1 . Furthermore, γ is decreasing in both α and δ and therefore an increase
in either of these two parameters also raises rc. This comes about because an increase in α or
δ increases the cost imposed on the licensee if he is found liable for cheating, in addition to
the damages for unpaid royalties. Observe that as ϕ → 0, γ → 1 and rc → 0. There is no
enforcement in this case and the maximum sustainable per-unit royalty is zero. As ϕ→ 1, the
converse is true, as cheating never pays in this case.
7.4 The effect of competition on optimal royalties
With log-linear demand, as the diversion ratio increases holding the own elasticity η constant,
the licensor desires a higher royalty to mitigate the adverse effects of downstream competition on
joint profits. With perfect contract enforcement, the per-unit royalty is an increasing function
ofD. An increase in the diversion ratio has a symmetric effect on the licensee’s profit if he cheats
and the profit if he reports royalties truthfully. Therefore, when the enforcement constraint
is binding, the maximum per-unit royalty that the licensor can charge without inducing the
licensee to cheat is independent of the diversion ratio.22 Summarizing:
Proposition 10. Suppose demand is given by the log-linear example. Let D be the diversion
ratio and hold η constant:
(i) If rˆ = r∗, the licensor’s optimal per-unit royalty is increasing in D.
(ii) If rˆ = rc, the licensor’s optimal per-unit royalty is independent of D.
22Log-linear demand is a special case in this respect. See Section 3.4.
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(iii) The critical value ϕc for which enforcement is a binding constraint is increasing in D.
Figure 2 shows r∗ and rc as a function of the enforcement probability ϕ for different values of
the diversion ratio. Holding η constant, it is more difficult to sustain the joint-profit maximizing
solution when the downstream market is more competitive in the sense that for a given value of
the enforcement probability it is more likely that the incentive compatibility constraint limits
the per-unit royalty when D is large.
Enforcement probability (ϕ)
P
er
-u
ni
t
ro
ya
lty
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Max royalty under
probabilistic enforcement
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Figure 2. Per-unit royalties with perfect and imperfect enforcement (η=2)
An increase in the diversion ration D holding the own-elasticity η constant increases the
per-unit royalty when licensing contracts can be enforced perfectly and reduces downstream
profits and investment. In contrast to Spulber (2013), greater competition in this sense does
not lead to greater (downstream) innovation when contracts are enforced perfectly.
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7.5 Investment incentives with imperfect enforcement
When the no-cheating constraint is binding, optimal investments satisfy
e∗ =
σ
1− δpi
∗
j (c+ rˆ(ϕ), e
∗).
where
pi∗j (c+ rˆ(ϕ), e) = A(e)
[(
η
η − 1
)
(c+ rˆ(ϕ))
]−η(1−D)+1
.
When the no-cheating constraint is binding, the strength of downstream competition as
measured by the diversion ratio has no effect on per-unit royalties in the log-linear example.
Downstream profit, however, is increasing in the diversion ratio for a given value of the per-
unit royalty provided that
(
η
η−1
)
(c + rˆ(ϕ)) > 1. Investment is increasing in the diversion
ratio when the no-cheating constraint is binding. Greater competition in this case leads to
more innovation as in Spulber (2013), but only when contract enforcement is weak so that the
no-cheating constraint is binding.
8 Conclusions
Kenneth Arrow (2012) posed a “licensing puzzle.” He wrote, “It is generally accepted that the
main source of profits to the innovator are those derived from temporary monopoly. Why is
it that royalties are not an equivalent source of revenues? In simple theory, the two should
be equivalent. Indeed, if there is heterogeneity in productive efficiency, in the use of the
innovation in production, then it should generally be more profitable to the innovator to grant
a licence... [But] I have the impression that licensing is a minor source of revenues.”23 We
show that imperfect enforcement of licensing contracts can cause a technology rights owner to
limit the transfer of technology, either by licensing exclusively or by integrating vertically and
substituting own production for licensing.
However, imperfect enforcement is not without benefits. Imperfect enforcement can require
23Arrow (2012), p.47.
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a licensor to choose lower royalties that vary with output than the licensor would choose if
the contracts could be enforced perfectly. These lower variable royalties increase the profits of
downstream firms and encourage these firms to invest to improve their products or lower costs
even if a licensor can charge fixed fees that extract downstream profits.
Exclusive licensing and vertical integration eliminate enforcement constraints when the func-
tion of a per-unit royalty is to soften downstream competition and increase incentives for down-
stream investment, although at the risk of other distortions. Exclusive licensing compromises
the benefits from downstream differentiation. Vertical integration introduces an additional
hazard if the integrated firm also contracts with nonintegrated licensees. After licenses have
been accepted, the integrated firm’ profit-maximizing downstream price may differ from the
price that maximizes the joint profit of the integrated firm and its licensees. This reduces the
maximum fixed fees that licensees would pay for a license.
The potential for cheating can have negative consequences for licensing and technology
transfer. However, cheating does not occur in an equilibrium outcome in our model and the
threat of cheating can cause a rights owner to structure contract terms in ways that promote
innovation and welfare. If the cheating threat is not so great as to cause the licensor to forego
non-exclusive licensing, the threat of cheating raises downstream profits (excluding fixed fees),
promotes innovation by downstream producers, lowers consumer prices and, by constraining
variable royalty payments to be less than a level that would induce under-reporting by the
licensee, can help a licensor to commit to license terms. The dark cloud of irresponsible licensee
conduct is not without some silver linings.
41
References
Allison, J. R. and M. A. Lemley (1998), “Empirical analysis of the validity of litigated patents,”
American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 185–275.
Anand, B. N. and T. Khanna (2000), “The structure of licensing contracts,” Journal of Industrial
Economics, Vol. 48, pp. 103–135.
Aoki, R. and J.-L. Hu (1999), “Licensing vs. Litigation: the effect of the legal system on
incentives to innovate,”Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 8, pp.133–160.
Arrow, Kenneth (2012), “The Economics of Inventive Activity Over Fifty Years,” in J. Lerner
and S. Stern (eds.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity - Revisited, University of
Chicago Press.
AUTM (Association of University Technology Managers) (2007), U.S. Licensing Activity Sur-
vey: FY 2007.
AUTM (Association of University Technology Managers) (2009-2012), U.S. Licensing Activity
Survey: FY 2009-2012 Highlights.
Ayres, I. and P. Klemperer (1999), “Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Inno-
vation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies,” Michi-
gan Law Review, Vol. 97, pp. 986-1033.
Ben-Shahar, O (2011), “Damages for Unlicensed Use,” University of Chicago Law Review, Vol.
78, pp. 7-29.
Bousquet, A., H. Cremer, M. Ivaldi and M. Wolkowicz (1998), “Risk Sharing in Licensing,”
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 16, pp. 535-554.
Branstetter, L. G., Raymond F. and C. Fritz Foley (2006), “Do Stronger Intellectual Property
Rights Increase International Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U. S. Firm-Level
Panel Data,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 121, pp. 321-349.
42
Chen, Y. (2013), “Refusal to Deal, Intellectual Property Rights, and Antitrust,” Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 30, pp. 533-557.
Choi, J. P. (2009), “Alternative Damage Rules and Probabilistic Intellectual Property Rights:
Unjust Enrichment, Lost Profits, and Reasonable Royalty Remedies,” Information Economics
and Policy, Vol. 21, pp. 145–157.
Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (1993), “Tax Evasion and Optimal Commodity Taxation,” Journal
of Public Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 261-275.
Datamonitor (2005), Licensing Strategies: Trends in the Top 20 Pharmaceutical Companies’
Activity.
Dasgupta, P. and J. Stiglitz (1980), “Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity,”
Economic Journal, Vol. 90, pp. 266-293.
Ellingsen, T. and E. G. Kristiansen (2011), “Financial Contracting Under Imperfect Enforce-
ment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 126, pp. 323-371.
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (2008). “How Strong Are Weak Patents?,” American Economic
Review, vol. 98, pp: 1347-69.
Friedman, J. W. (1977), Oligopoly and the Theory of Games, New York: North-Holland.
Gallini, N. T. (1984), “Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing,”
American Economic Review, Vol. 74, pp. 931-941.
Gallini, N. T. (1992), “Patent Policy and Costly Imitation,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.
21, pp.106-112.
Gallini, N. T. and R. Winter (1985), “Licensing in the Theory of Innovation,” RAND Journal
of Economics, Vol. 16, pp. 237-252.
Gallini, N. and N. Lutz (1992), “Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising,” Journal
of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 8, pp. 471-501.
43
Graham, S., R. Merges, P. Samuelson, and T. Sichelman (2009), “High Technology Entrepreneurs
and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey,” Berkeley Technology Law
Journal, Vol. 24, pp. 255-327.
Henry, M. D. and J.L. Turner (2010), “Patent Damages and Spatial Competition,” Journal of
Industrial Economics, Vol. 58, pp. 279–305.
Hernández-Murillo, R. and G. Llobet (2006), “Patent Licensing Revisited: Heterogeneous Firms
and Product Differentiation,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 26, pp.
149-175.
Janicke, P. M. and L. Ren (2006), “Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?,” AIPLA Quarterly
Journal, Vol. 34, pp. 1-43.
Kamien, M. (1992), “Patent Licensing,” in R.J. Aumann and S. Hart, eds., Handbook of Game
Theory with Economic Applications I, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Katz, M. L. (1991), “Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments,”
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 22(3), pp. 307-328, Autumn.
Katz, M. L. and C. Shapiro (1985), “On the Licensing of Innovations,” RAND Journal of
Economics , Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 504-520, Winter.
Layne-Farrar, A. and G. Llobet (2014), “Moving Beyond Simple Examples: Assessing the
Incremental Value Rule Within Standards,” International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Vol. 36, pp. 57–69.
López Á. L. and X. Vives (2014), “Cooperation, R&D Spillovers and Antitrust Policy,” working
paper.
Mortimer, J. (2008), “Vertical Contracts in the Video Rental Industry,” Review of Economic
Studies, Vol. 75, pp. 165-199.
Nagaoka, S. (2009), “Does Strong Patent Protection Facilitate International Technology Trans-
fer? Some evidence from licensing contracts of Japanese firms,” Journal of Technology Transfer,
Vol. 34, pp. 128–144.
44
O’Brien, D. P. and G. Shaffer (1992), “Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts,” RAND Jour-
nal of Economics , Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 299-308, Autumn.
Rey, P. and J. Tirole (1986), “The Logic of Vertical Restraints,” American Economic Review ,
Vol. 76, pp. 921-939.
Saracho, A. I. (2002), “Patent Licensing Under Strategic Delegation,” Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy, Vol. 11, pp. 225–251.
Schmalensee, R. (1981), “Monopolistic Two-Part Pricing Arrangements,” Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 12 (Autumn), 445-460.
Schankerman, M. and S. Scotchmer (2001), “Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Intellectual
Property,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, pp.199–220.
Scotchmer, S. (1991), “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 29-41.
Scotchmer, S. and Y. Park (2006), “Digital Rights Management and the Pricing of Digital
Products,” NBER Working paper 11532.
Schuett, F. (2012), “Field-of-Use Restrictions in Licensing Agreements,” International Journal
of Industrial Organization, Vol. 30, pp. 403–416.
Spulber, D. F. (2013), “How Do Competitive Pressures Affect Incentives to Innovate When
There Is a Market for Inventions?,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 121, pp. 1007-1054.
Stewart, D. R. and J. A. Byrd (2014), “Trust, But Verify: Are You Collecting Your Fair Share
of Royalties?,” Intellectual Asset Management, January/February, pp. 42-47.
Takeyama, L. N. (1994), “The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellec-
tual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities,” Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics, vol. 42, pp. 155–166.
Vives, X. (2008), “Innovation and Competitive Pressure,” Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol.
56, pp. 419–69.
45
Waters, R. (2104), “Microsoft files legal complaint against Samsung,” Financial Times, August
1, 2014.
White, L., and M. Williams (2009), “Bargaining with Imperfect Enforcement,” RAND Journal
of Economics, Vol. 40, no. 2 (Summer).
46
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: The first-order condition for downstream investment is
∂Π∗j(ρ, e)
∂ej
− 1 = 0 for j = 1, 2.
To examine the effects of an increased running royalty to Firm j, differentiate the first-order
conditions to obtain the following system of equations in matrix form.
 ∂2Π∗j∂(ej)2 ∂2Π∗j∂ej∂ei
∂2Π∗i
∂ej∂ei
∂2Π∗i
∂(ei)
2
 dejdrj
dei
drj
 =
 − ∂2Π∗j∂ej∂rj
0
 . (20)
Solving for dej/drj and dei/drj,
dej
drj
=
− ∂2Π∗j
∂ej∂rj
∂2Π∗i
∂(ei)
2
|M |
dei
drj
=
∂2Π∗j
∂ej∂rj
∂2Π∗i
∂ej∂ei
|M |
where |M | is the deteriminant of the matrix in eq. (20), which is positive given an assumed
stable equilibrium. By the second order condition ∂
2Π∗i
∂(ei)
2 < 0, and since Π∗j(ρ, e) =
1
1−δpi
∗
j (ρ, e)
it follows that
sign
(
dej
drj
)
= sign
(
∂2pi∗j
∂ej∂rj
)
and
sign
(
dei
drj
)
= sign
(
∂2pi∗j
∂ej∂rj
∂2pi∗i
∂ej∂ei
)
.
Furthermore, ∂
2pi∗i
∂ej∂ei
> 0 if investments are strategic complements and ∂
2pi∗i
∂ej∂ei
< 0 if investments
are strategic substitutes.
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Proof of Proposition 1: The licensor’s profit is
ΠU(ρ1, ρ2) =
∑
j=1,2
[
1
1− δ
(
pi∗j + rjq
∗
j
)− ej] .
The licensor’s choice of the per-unit royalty r∗j solves
dΠU(ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2)
drj
|e∗
+
 11− δ
 dpi∗idej︸︷︷︸
Effect on fixed fee from Firm i
+ rj
dq∗j
dej
+ ri
dq∗i
dej︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect on running royalties
+
∂pi∗j
∂ej
− 1
 dejdrj
+
 11− δ
 dpi∗jdei︸︷︷︸
Effect on fixed fee from Firm j
+ rj
dq∗j
dei
+ ri
dq∗i
dei︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect on running royalties
+
∂pi∗i
∂ei
− 1
 deidrj
= 0.
The first term accounts for the effect of the per-unit royalty on joint profits holding in-
vestment constant. The second term accounts for the indirect effect on total royalties from an
increase in the per-unit royalty that affects investment by Firm j while the third term accounts
for the indirect effect on total royalties from an increase in the per-unit royalty that affects
investment by Firm i.
From the first order condition for the downstream firms, 1
1−δ∂pi
∗
k/∂ek − 1 = 0 for k = 1, 2,
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we have
dΠU(ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2)
drj
|e∗
+
1
1− δ
 dpi∗idej︸︷︷︸
Effect on fixed fee from firm i
+
d(rjq
∗
j + riq
∗
i )
dej︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect on running royalties
 dejdrj
+
1
1− δ
 dpi∗jdei︸︷︷︸
Effect on fixed fee from firm j
+
d(rjq
∗
j + riq
∗
i )
dei︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect on running royalties
 deidrj
= 0.
From Lemma 1, the term dej/drj has the same sign as ∂2pi∗j (ρ, e)/∂ej∂rj. Therefore, if
an increase in downstream investment increases the total license payment, the licensor max-
imizes her profit by choosing r∗j < r¯j if ∂2pi∗j (ρ, e)/∂ej∂rj < 0 and investments are strategic
complements.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let τ = T − t, the number of periods remaining before the patent
expires. Assume pij = pij(c) for all τ ≤ 0. Firm j’s profit from truthful reporting is for τ = 1,
Π∗j(1) = pij(c+ r) +
δ
1− δpij(c)
Firm j’s profit if he cheats is for τ = 1
Πcj(1) = pij(c+ ϕr) +
δ
1− δpij(c).
When τ = 1, the only incentive compatible royalty is rˆ(1) = 0. Furthermore, Πcj(1) =
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1
1−δpij(c) = Π
∗
j(1). Suppose τ ≥ 2. Firm j’s profit with truthful reporting is
Π∗j(τ) =
1− δτ
1− δ pij(c+ r) +
δτ
1− δpij(c)
Firm j’s profit if he cheats is for τ ≥ 2
Πcj(τ) = pij(c+ ϕr) + ϕδ(1− α)
[
1− δτ−1
1− δ pij(c+ r)
]
+
δτ
1− δpij(c) + (1− ϕ)δΠ
c
j(τ − 1).
The largest incentive compatible royalty satisfies
pij(c+ rˆ(τ)) = K(τ)
[
pij(c+ ϕrˆ(τ)) + (1− ϕ)δΠcj(τ − 1)
]
, (21)
where
K(τ) =
1− δ
1− ϕ(1− α)δ − δτ (1− ϕ(1− α)) .
Note that K(τ) is decreasing in τ. Furthermore, holding r constant
Πcj(τ)− Πcj(τ − 1) =
δτ
1− δ [ϕ(1− α)pij(c+ r)− pij(c)] < 0.
Therefore, holding r constant, the RHS of (21) is decreasing in τ . It follows that
pij(c+ rˆ(τ)) < pij(c+ rˆ(τ − 1))
and therefore rˆ(τ) ≥ rˆ(τ − 1).
Proof of Proposition 6: Part (i) follows from Proposition 3 and Lemma 1. Since rcj is
non-decreasing in ϕ, an increase in the strength of contract enforcement weakly reduces the
licensee’s profit-maximizing investment when ∂2pi∗j (ρ, e)/∂ej∂rj ≤ 0. Part (ii) is immediate as
the enforcement probability has no effect on r∗j .
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Proof of Proposition 9: The licensor is better off with an exclusive licensee if for some k
max
ek
[
1
1− δpi
s
k(ck, ek)− ek
]
> max
ej
∑
j=1,2
[
1
1− δ
(
pij(ρˆ(ϕ), e) + r
c
jqj(ρˆ(ϕ), e)
)− ej] . (22)
where 1
1−δpi
s
k(c, ek) − ek is the net profit earned by Firm k when it is the exclusive licensee
with a zero per-unit royalty and ρˆ(ϕ) = (c1 + rˆ1(ϕ), c2 + rˆ2(ϕ)). If rˆj(ϕ) = r∗j for j ∈ N , this
inequality cannot be satisfied if there are efficiencies from licensing both firms. If rˆj(ϕ) = 0,
this inequality is satisfied if Firm k’s monopoly profit with a zero royalty exceeds the total
profit earned by both licensees with a zero royalty. Furthermore, the right-hand side of (22) is
a continuous function of rˆj for j = 1, 2. Therefore there exist per-unit royalties rˆj for which the
inequality is satisfied. Moreover, rˆj = 0 when ϕ = 0, rˆj = r∗j when ϕ = 1, and is non-decreasing
in ϕ for ϕ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore there exists an enforcement level ϕˆ for which it is optimal for the
licensor to license a single firm exclusively if ϕ < ϕˆ.
Proof of Proposition 10: Part (i) follows directly from equation (18) and part (ii) from
equation (19). Part (iii) follows by solving for the critical value of the enforcement probability
for which rc(ϕ) = r∗.
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Appendix B: Alternative damage rules
1. Unjust enrichment
Suppose that damages for cheating on a licensing contract by failing to report royalties are
proportional to the profit that the licensee unjustly earns with the licensor’s technology. As
in the main text we assume the licensor chooses a per unit royalty r and the licensee uses the
licensed technology to produce a product with constant marginal cost c and demand q(p). If
the licensor detects underpayment, she can sue for damages, which incurs a litigation cost Kp.
A court verifes infringement with probability ϕ and if s > 0 assesses damages
Dpi = p˜i − pi,
where
p˜i = max
q
(p− c− r(1− s))q
is the licensee’s profit when it under-reports royalties and
pi = max
q
(p− c− r)q
is the licensee’s profit when it reports royalties truthfully. The difference p˜i − pi measures the
amount by which the licensee has profited by failing to report royalties. This is the licensee’s
unjust enrichment.
Licensee j’s expected profit in the period during which cheating occurs is
picj = p˜ij − ϕDpi
= ϕpij(p
∗
i , c+ r(1− s), e) + (1− ϕ)pi(p∗i , c, e)
Lemma A2.1: Given ϕ < 1, the licensee will choose s = 1 if he cheats.
Proof. Follows from d
ds
pij(p
∗
i , c+ r(1− s), e) > 0.
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The licencee’s expected profit from cheating is
Πcj = pi
c
j + ϕ
δ
1− δϕ(1− α)pij(p
∗
i , c+ r, e) + (1− ϕ)δΠcj,
where δ is the discount factor. Re-arranging terms,
Πcj =
1
1− δ(1− ϕ)
[
picj +
δ
1− δϕ(1− α)pij(p
∗
i , c+ r, e)
]
and the licensee will not cheat if
1
1− δpij(p
∗
i , c+ r, e) ≥ Πcj.
This condition is
pij(p
∗
i , c+ r, e) ≥ (γpi)pi(p∗i , c, e) (23)
where
γpi =
1
1 + α
(
δ
1−δ
) (
ϕ
1−ϕ
) . (24)
For the log-linear example, the critical royalty for which truthful reporting is incentive com-
patible is
rc(ϕ) = c
[(
1
γpi
) 1
η−1
− 1
]
Note that γpi < γ if ϕ > 0. Compared to damages equal to unpaid royalties, unjust enrichment
damages allow the licensor to charge a higher per-unit royalty without inducing the licensee to
cheat on his royalty obligations.
All of the propositions in the main text continue to hold when damages equal unjust en-
richment. The analogy to Proposition 4 holds because when damages are equal to unjust
enrichment,
drj
dϕ
= −
(
dγpi
dϕ
)
pi(p∗i , c, e)
q(p∗i , c+ r, e)
≥ 0.
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2. Termination of the licensing contract
Suppose the licensor detects cheating with probability ϕ and revokes the license in the next
period if cheating is detected. There are no damages other than the revocation of the license.
This scenario may apply if the licensor cannot appeal to a court or other authority to enforce
the licensing agreement and if the licensor has no collateral. If the licensee cheats, he should fail
to report all contractually specified royalties (s = 1) as this maximizes his profit from cheating.
The probability ϕ is a unilateral choice by the rights owner.
To facilitate comparison with other damage rules, we continue to assume that the licensee
can renegotiate the contract following an episode of under-reporting and that renegotiation costs
the licensee a fraction α of the royalties that the licensee would earn if he had not cheated.
Under these assumption, and given that the licensee earns zero profit without the licensed
technology, the licensee’s expected profit from cheating for the period in which the cheating
occurs is
picj = pij(p
∗
i , c, e)
The licencee’s expected profit from cheating is
Πcj = pi
c
j + ϕ
δ
1− δϕ(1− α)pij(p
∗
i , c+ r, e) + (1− ϕ)δΠcj,
where δ is the discount factor. Hence,
Πcj =
1
1− δ(1− ϕ)
[
pij(p
∗
i , c, e) +
δ
1− δϕ(1− α)pij(p
∗
i , c+ r, e)
]
and the licensee will not cheat if
1
1− δpij(p
∗
i , c+ r, e) ≥ Πcj.
This condition is
pij(p
∗
i , c+ r, e) ≥ (γx)pi(p∗i , c, e) (25)
54
where
γx =
1
1 + αϕ
(
δ
1−δ
) . (26)
For the log-linear example, the critical royalty for which truthful reporting is incentive
compatible is
rc(ϕ) = c
[(
1
γx
) 1
η−1
− 1
]
.
Note that γx = γ. Compared to damages equal to unpaid royalties, the maximum per-unit
royalty for which truthful reporting is incentive compatible is lower when damages for under-
reporting results in termination of the licensing contract. The difference between the two
damage regimes is that a licensee who is found liable for cheating does not have to pay back
under-reported royalties when damages result only in the termination of the contract (assuming
the same α in both regimes). Consequently, the licensee has a greater incentive to cheat and
the royalty required to prevent cheating is lower. However, the threat of termination can allow
a higher incentive compatible royalty if α = 1 with termination (no future benefits to the
licensee) but α < 1 when damages for under-reporting are proportional to unpaid royalties.
All of the propositions in the main text continue to hold in this scenario. The analogy to
Proposition 4 holds because when the penalty is revocation of the license,
drj
dϕ
= −
(
dγx
dϕ
)
pi(p∗i , c, e)
q(p∗i , c+ r, e)
≥ 0.
Observation: Observe that the highest incentive compatible running royalty can be ranked
in the following way
r(unjust enrichment) ≥ r(reasonable royalty) ≥ r(termination of contract)
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